Russell: Problems of Philosophy

Zarathustra

Out of interest, what would you see as being the right reason?

ZarathustraX

I'd agree with Moore on the Naturalistic Fallacy. The open question argument is shot so you can't use that like Ayer wants to, but I think perhaps you could revive it under some sort of private language argument. I'm still working on that one, it's difficult to make it not too powerful and not to weak (though I'm leaning towards the powerful version anyway because I think it helps in other areas- the whole thing I was getting at with you and Wanderer and Grumball Cake in the Phil Soc thread.)

Reply 21

Zarathustra

2

Calvin

I'd agree with Moore on the Naturalistic Fallacy. The open question argument is shot so you can't use that like Ayer wants to, but I think perhaps you could revive it under some sort of private language argument. I'm still working on that one, it's difficult to make it not too powerful and not to weak (though I'm leaning towards the powerful version anyway because I think it helps in other areas- the whole thing I was getting at with you and Wanderer and Grumball Cake in the Phil Soc thread.)

But Moore establishes the Naturalistic Fallacy on the basis of the open question argument (which precludes an emotive theory of ethics anyway), so without that aren't you merely asserting that naturalism propagates a fallacy without actually showing that to be the case?

ZarathustraX (Not an ethical naturalist, before anyone accuses me :ninja:

)

Reply 22

Calvin

14

Zarathustra

But Moore establishes the Naturalistic Fallacy on the basis of the open question argument (which precludes an emotive theory of ethics anyway), so without that aren't you merely asserting that naturalism propagates a fallacy without actually showing that to be the case?

ZarathustraX (Not an ethical naturalist, before anyone accuses me :ninja:

)

Zackly! That's what I mean, I think the naturalistic fallacy is right, as do Moore and Ayer, but Moore and Ayer think they can use the open question argument which is completely wrong- it assumes that any time you know the meaning of two words and those two words mean the same thing you can instantly identify that. Seems plausible, but look at epitsemology and trying hard to work out whether a definition for 'knowledge' is correct. It's something you have to think about for quite some time, it doesn't just click.

So then you need some support for the open question argument and I think perhaps you can get there by denying analytic truths and, more fundamentally, the possibility of definition. If I can't define words then I can't say 'good mean X Y and Z' and then you end up right back at the naturallistic fallacy without needing the open question argument.

Perhaps you could demonstrate the naturalistic fallacy by maintaining an is/ought gap in the face of the naturalistic attempt to bridge it- is and ought statements are so different that the naturalistic attempt which bridges the gap can't possibily be right- but that's really just a stop-gap measure, it doesn't have much philosophical punch. Ultimately you need a proper argument rather than just a plausible assertion.

Russell: Problems of Philosophy

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