Original post by paultheotheroneI did ok (First), but I certainly realise I am still ignorant and have a lot to learn. I am in no way claiming to be an expert and am willing to change my mind.
Is it as scientific as medicine in the context of practical application? Say we looked at the fusiform face area using fMRI, you couldn't, unless there was a blatant ablation, say that a person has prosopagnosia WITHOUT subjectively assessing them (asking/testing them do you have problems recognising faces). I realise this is what a lot of psychology is, assessing subjectivity, but fMRI in this case is a bit redundant in that the person has already told us they can't recognise faces, and fMRI alone can't confirm this (unless there is a lesion). We then can't attempt to 'fix' this problem without using behavioural strategies which the person possibly already incorporates anyway, so apart from intellectual curiosity, fMRI hasn't been that helpful in either diagnosis (I use the term very loosely) or what can be done to help the individual. I have been speaking to one of my lecturers on this same topic, and he pointed out that "fMRI is done by a physicist, sonographer and a radiologist (medic)."
What is the role of a psychologist in this, other than to philosophise about the results (basically, be a philosopher) teach it, and inevitably suggest more research needs to be conducted if writing a scientific paper. If there was a brain lesion, this becomes the neurologist's (not the neuroscientists') department. In medicine, practical application to an affected organ/illness can be subjected to intervention that deems necessary the examination of said organ/body in the first place. To me, this is simply not true of fMRI. Again, I am not intending to challenge its merits as an intellectual pursuit and realise it is a very young science, but question its standing in a practical context to other sciences which validates the research (and therefore the money spent-of course this is political) conducted in these areas to a higher degree.
Apologies if this is not making sense, and I am quite prepared to be schooled in this area.
Neuroscience (I think) rests on the premise that this is what we found after an act has occurred. It can't predict anything to any degree of certainty that the other sciences can, because of its laws are based on human will.
One of the main problems I came across during my degree is the bestowment of the title Dr after the requisite study period. Some psychologists, not all, seem to think this is akin to becoming a medical doctor. It is not, and does not give such a person to make diagnoses based on Likert scales, questionnaires and non objective physical tests. (I'm now talking about the social construction of certain disorders in psychology). Medical doctors, as far as I know, arrive at the confirmation of an illness using different criteria from psychologists (certainly not questionnaires, or scales) and are impersonal diagnoses. Social sciences (oxymoron?) is not a medical diagnosis but a measure of what is socially acceptable during the time period which as we know, changes. Thus the label(diagnosis) given by a social scientist to a person can actually be very damaging itself, and essentially one cannot prove one is now not 'disordered' as there was no objective criteria for demonstrating this in the first place. Thus, if we are comparing social science to medical science, there is an obvious demarcation in the methods and diagnoses both use. These views are largely based on Thomas Szasz's writings, and whilst linked to fMRI research, are different to the objections I spoke of above regarding that method.
The mind/brain dichotomy is something I will have to cogitate on before posting, but is to me, a largely linguistic problem and also a physical problem. If mental events are just ephenomenalism (non-physical), does that not present a problem for physicalism?
Sorry if this is incoherent or nonsensical.