Ban on single-use plastic cutlery comes into force in England

You've yet to present any cost / benefit analysis that demonstrates that climate change, on balance of likelihood and severity, gives us the best course of action for minimising suffering from human extinction.

Your argument, which is centred in apathy, is that we shouldn't care about climate change becsause something worse could come along if we fix it. That's akin to saying you don't care about a nuclear holocaust because something worse could cause more suffering.

The vaccine example isn't comparable because it involves variables, relating to how much suffering people experience, that we can directly measure and compare. With hypothetical human extinction scenarios we do not have that luxury.

I’m not claiming that. I’m claiming that we have no cost-benefit analysis demonstrating that preventing climate change is the best course of action to minimise suffering. It may be or it may not be. Whereas you’re claiming that it is. I don’t think we have enough information to be able to say that.



But that’s no different to you claiming that the reason we should care about preventing climate change is that an extinction event with less suffering “could” come along later (e.g. the form of dying out due to low birth rates). I’m simply pointing out that your argument can be applied exactly the same way in reverse as well.



The analogy of the vaccine also shows that simply trying to zeroise suffering in the short term isn’t always the best option. Furthermore, you’ve just made my point for me. With the vaccine, we pretty much know that using it is the better option because we can measure those variables. With climate change, we don’t know, because we can’t measure them.

An odd sentiment from someone who wants to ban abortion.

This is my point though. You don't have a cost benefit analysis because we are dealing with hypotheticals that you can't measure. It is therefore neither here nor there whether something other than climate change could cause more suffering. In the absence of any information we should work towards a situation where suffering either won't happen or is less likely, i.e. by stopping the things that will cause suffering (climate change, nuclear war, etc).

We shouldn't just sit back and do nothing on the basis that 'well, something worse could happen... we don't know for sure'. That's the sort of reasoning that would justify not caring about a nuclear holocaust.

I would also say that we are not completely void of information. We know that the human population is very likely to decline in the next 100-200 years based on the trends seen from almost all developing nations. On that basis, even if something other than climate change were to occur then fewer people would still die.

But we don't have an absence of any information. We have the information that if extinction via climate change is prevented now, then some other extinction event will happen later.. The information we're lacking is whether that event will involve more suffering or less suffering than extinction via climate change. Without this information you can't say that one scenario is preferable to the other.


Well I disagree with that. I think that preventing a bad thing is only worthwhile if you have at least some reason to believe that the alternative scenario will be better, not worse.

There's also a difference between nuclear holocaust and climate change, in that the impact of a nuclear holocaust is immediate. If a full on nuclear holocaust takes place right now, it will be this generation going extinct, not some future one. If an extinction event is inevitable, objectively I don't think it matters which generation it happens to, be it an earlier one or a later one. But it's still in my personal interest to hope that such an event doesn't happen while I'm still alive, with me being one of those who suffer and get their life cut short. As much as I care about minimising others' suffering, in general I care more about minimising my own.



I would agree with you if we knew that the next extinction event would happen within the next 100-200 years, and that the population at that time would be lower than it is now. But we don't know that. The next extinction event could happen sooner than that (when the population would still probably be higher than it is now), or it could happen a million or a billion years from now; none of us have any clue what the population size will look like then.

In the absence of information our position shouldn't be to do nothing, at least not if you are trying to claim you want to minimise suffering. What you would be doing is signing off suffering for future generations and guarantee that it will happen, without even giving them the chance to live through their lives without it. That's not minimising suffering, that's just apathy and selfishness.

You’ve basically just ignored the whole point I’ve made though. So I’ll make it again:

Minimising suffering isn’t about simply aiming for zero and ignoring the risk that in doing so you could end up causing more (as demonstrated by the vaccine analogy). It is about comparing the relative risks of both scenarios, if you have the information to be able to do that. In the absence of information about those risks, the position is that we don’t know which action is likely to lead to less or more suffering in the long term. So there is no way to say one option is preferable to the other.

Your argument incorrectly treats suffering as if it’s a binary “people either will suffer or they won’t”, and entirely ignores the fact that it’s a matter of risk and degrees of severity.

I haven't ignored your point, the problem is that your point is a load of nonsense. We aren't in a situation where we can compare matters of risk, degrees of severity, etc, so these are all irrelevant points to make. Clearly if we could do this then the argument would be different (e.g. your example on vaccines).

But we aren't thinking about that sort of situation. In our situation we can only work with hypotheticals. You cannot claim to want to minimise suffering if you are happy for us to systemically prevent situations where suffering would not occur. There is a preferable option: it is to give us the opportunity to make that situation happen. All your position stands for is apathy, it has nothing to do with wanting to see us (or future generations) live in a world where suffering doesn't happen.

It's not nonsense, it's a pretty simple concept actually. The preferable scenario is the one which, overall, is likely to result in less suffering. But since we’re unable to compare likelihood and severity of suffering between the two scenarios, we can't determine which one is preferable.

It’s not enough to say “well Scenario A definitely involves some suffering and Scenario B might not". That information alone doesn't prove that B is preferable. Because If we had further information, it could just as easily reveal A to be preferable.

We don’t have that information, so the usual logic of comparing risks, likelihoods etc. doesn’t apply. We have to work with what we know will happen (e.g. climate change causing suffering) and what could happen if we prevent it (e.g. a world where suffering doesn't happen). The preferable option, in this context, is to stop climate change (at least if your ultimate ambition is to minimise suffering).

You could have just as legitimately said: “We have to work with what we know will happen (e.g. climate change causing suffering) and what could happen if we prevent it (e.g. a later extinction event causing twice as much suffering). So the preferable option, in this context, is not to stop climate change.”

You’re choosing to give more credence to the idea that stopping climate change might reduce suffering (to zero) as opposed to increasing it. But with no information on likelihoods and severities, there’s no justification for it. It’s not a valid argument.

A lack information doesn’t mean that “logic ceases to apply, we’re free to use faulty logic instead”. It means we don’t know what the logical conclusion from said information would be.

It is a valid argument. You are giving complete credence to something that will cause suffering, whereas I am giving credence to something that will at least give us the chance to avoid it. Yet, somehow, I am the one who isn't trying to minimise suffering? Your apathetic approach will only cause suffering, my approach might let us avoid it.

The logic of comparing risks, likelihoods, severity, etc, do not apply to this situation. The alternative has to be that we work with what is possible, else we guarantee that suffering occurs by taking the 'do nothing' approach and not acting upon climate change.

No, it’s not a valid argument. You keep pointing out that your approach “might let us avoid suffering” whilst conveniently forgetting that it also might increase suffering just as much, if not more. It’s a cherry picked argument.

Risk and severity is entirely relevant here. The logic is that we ideally should compare them as far as possible with the information we have. If we don’t have enough information to do that at all, we accept that we can’t reach a conclusion.

You don’t get to just decide at your own convenience that logic no longer applies, and that faulty reasoning should be used instead (i.e. treating suffering as if it’s a binary when we know the opposite is true). That’s not how logic works.

It's a perfectly valid argument. Risk and severity can't be compared in this situation so the logic you are trying to apply doesn't and wouldn't work.

It is perfectly logical, in this context, to instead work on the basis of what is possible. We know climate change will cause suffering, we know fixing climate change might prevent it. It is entirely logical, if you claim to want to minimise suffering, to pick the second option.

That doesn’t entitle us to use fallacious arguments instead. It means we are unable to reach a conclusion due to insufficient information.



Cherry picking isn’t logical, it is a fallacy.

Nothing about the argument is fallacious, it isn't cherry picking. It is working with what we know is possible when A) certainty and risk are impossible to define and B) we know that inaction will lead to suffering. It is a logical thing to do if we want to minimise suffering.

“Working with what we know is possible” would involve acknowledging both possibilities, not just the one that suits you and ignoring the other, as you have done. That’s exactly what cherry picking is.

If you think your argument isn’t fallacious, then you should be just as ready to accept this one: ”We know climate change will cause suffering, we know fixing climate change might cause even more. It is entirely logical, if you claim to want to minimise suffering, to pick the first option”.

I haven't ignored that possibility, it just doesn't change what the course of action should be in this scenario (if we want to minimise suffering, that is).

Why wouldn’t it, when the only argument you’ve given for that course of action is balanced by an equally strong one for the opposite side?

It isn't balanced by that. If the goal is to minimise suffering (in a context where risks, probabilities, severities, etc, are completely unknown and might never be known) then choosing the option which grants you the chance of completely preventing suffering is the best option.