Micro econ question help

Hi! Could someone please help answering the following question: Chas and Dave are football fans. Chas has a marginal valuation for matches of PC = 40 – QC and Dave has a marginal valuation of PD = 50 –QD, where QC and QD are the number of football matches that each of them attends. The club’s marginal and average cost per match per fan is 20 and the profit maximizing football club knows the marginal valuations of each fan.

(a) [8 marks] Suppose that the football club can charge a fixed fee for the season and a priceper match. What fixed fee would it charge to Chas and what fixed fee would it charge to Dave?

(b) [5 marks] Suppose instead, that the club is restricted to offering a single two-part tariff to both fans: either the fixed fee and price per match for Chas derived in (a) above or the fixed fee and price per match derived for Dave in (a) above. Which would it charge and how many matches would each of them attend?

(c) [7 marks] Now suppose that fixed fees are abolished by law, and only a price per match is allowed. What prices would the club charge to each of the fans? Would the club make more profit than in situation (b) above?

(d) [5 marks] Comment on welfare implications of the three different pricing schemes in (a),(b) and (c) above

.I'm guessing it's to do with MR=MC and calculating the Q and P for each but can't figure out how to do it.