The problem of evil.

The Wyskstra line is interesting, but I think by itself it isn't a sufficient response. It can be too easily reversed onto the Theist - what relevant epistemic access does he possibly have to affirm God is morally perfect, as opposed to anything else (how'd you tell, perhaps, between morally perfect and just 'very good indeed?') It isn't an insurmountable objection, but I think it shows Wysktra's line runs into very similar difficulties that people have thrown at religious experience. Wysktra's argument implies concession (even if only for the sake of the argument) that the EPoE appears sound - that, commonly, the world seems to suggest that Theism is implausible, due to the presense of evil, but, according to Wysktra, with proper realization of our limitations to witness this, we can only deem this argument as inscruatable. To overcome this and affirm Theism, you need to find some sort of 'special sort' of experience which is not subject to Wysktra's criticism. But I don't see how this can arise - one perhaps has even greater grounds for fielding (ironically) Humean objections to the idea of Theism borne out of religious experience or the like, and I don't see why one couldn't affirm other 'special sorts' of experience (moral outrage, emotional despair) to try and 'cancel this out.' In other words, if Wysktra's argument carries, I think Theists would be epistemically obliged to renounce their Theism through lacking the very sort of epistemic access necessary to make a judgement of such scope.

However, I don't really like this sort of 'you too' argument, although it works well in debate - it might give one's opponent a reason for dispensing with the argument, but it doesn't actually show it to be mistaken. But I think it is. The main reason is that evil, particularly the most heinous, gratuitous sort, doesn't really strike anyone as 'inscrutable.' Some things are so bad that it doesn't only seem factually absurd but morally reprehensible to consider the possibility that these can be any sense 'ultimately' a good thing, which is precisely what a theodicy must show. Of course, that is no reason to discount a possible explanation on the back of this, but I think it shows that it is pretty implausible to consider these judgements inscrutable. One could apply Wysktra's line of argument to any sort of axiological judgement, and that seems absurd. Further, in some cases, if the supposed morally sufficient reason is suitably remote, it mightn't even be good at all. Even if it could be shown with some perfect knowledge analysis that the Asian Tsunami or the Second World War was ultimately good for the world, I don't think we'd change our judgement that these were, in fact, bad things.

Rowe lets Wyskstra off pretty lightly in his response to him, though, so maybe I've missed something he's picked up on.

Reply 121

RawJoh1

14

Sorry for taking a long time to reply.

monty1618

1) If God exists, God is omnipotent, omniscient and all-loving.
2) If God is omnipotent, then God has the power to eliminate all evil.
3) If God is omniscient, then God is aware of all evil.
4) If God is all loving, then God desires to eliminate all evil.
5) If God has the power to eliminate all evil, is aware of all evil, and desires to eliminate all evil then evil cannot exist
6) Evil exists
C) Therefore God doesn't exist

I won't even comment on (2) being disputed because I've never put an ounce of weight into the dispute.

Fine. But it's worth taking into account that many substantive positions rule out (or could rule out 2). (for example) If Molinism is false and we have libertarian free-will (you may not be a libertarian, but many theists are, and the lPoE tends to be discussed within the context of libertarian free-will) then God doesn't know our future free actions, and hence can only make best guesses about them. Given that, there's the very real chance that an omnipotent, omniscient God could err here, and thus evil as a result of free creaturely actions would happen.

Now maybe all that's crap. Maybe it is, I don't know. But it's worth considering and with respect I think you should put more than an ounce of weight into the dispute over 2, if only to be charitable towards the theist.

So yeah ... 2 is by no means guaranteed.

monty1618

As for (4) being disputed by God having a morally sufficient reason for permitting evil, it's a simple question: Does God not also have the power to prevent a situation from reaching the point where there is a morally sufficient reason for permitting evil?

My point was that if you rule out the possibility of a morally sufficient reason by fiat, you run the risk of begging the question against the theist. The atheist needs to show that there can be no successful defence, not simply premise that their cannot be.

As for your question - maybe God does have that power, and maybe He doesn't. Some philosophers far cleverer than me think that God really doesn't have total control over the sort of world He chooses to create. If they're right, then your thought doesn't seem quite so obvious.

Monty1618

Again, I chalk it up as semantics, with 'all' being the word that receives the picky plays here and there.

Yeah ... one of the problems is that people disagree in their analyses of omnipotence etc and what those analyses entail. But, if the lPoE is to work, it has to target the analyses that philosophical theists actually work with. Hence, you need to at least consider the various limits they might place on God's power/knowledge etc.

Reply 122

RawJoh1

14

GregoryJL

The Wyskstra line is interesting, but I think by itself it isn't a sufficient response. It can be too easily reversed onto the Theist - what relevant epistemic access does he possibly have to affirm God is morally perfect, as opposed to anything else (how'd you tell, perhaps, between morally perfect and just 'very good indeed?') It isn't an insurmountable objection, but I think it shows Wysktra's line runs into very similar difficulties that people have thrown at religious experience. Wysktra's argument implies concession (even if only for the sake of the argument) that the EPoE appears sound - that, commonly, the world seems to suggest that Theism is implausible, due to the presense of evil, but, according to Wysktra, with proper realization of our limitations to witness this, we can only deem this argument as inscrutable. To overcome this and affirm Theism, you need to find some sort of 'special sort' of experience which is not subject to Wysktra's criticism. But I don't see how this can arise - one perhaps has even greater grounds for fielding (ironically) Humean objections to the idea of Theism borne out of religious experience or the like, and I don't see why one couldn't affirm other 'special sorts' of experience (moral outrage, emotional despair) to try and 'cancel this out.' In other words, if Wysktra's argument carries, I think Theists would be epistemically obliged to renounce their Theism through lacking the very sort of epistemic access necessary to make a judgement of such scope.

Aye, that's a danger. Of course, it's perfectly possible to say that the ePoE fails (for something like Wykstra's reasons), but that some sort of epistemic objection to theism holds. The argument for theism not being warranted would then be offered, and we could see whether it's any good or not. Interestingly, I haven't read anything that goes down the line you suggest (ie. that we don't have the relevent epistemic access to form a judgement of moral perfection). That'd make a nice little twist on the faith and reason debate I think and yeah ... like you say it's not obvious how the theist would justify the moral perfection line.

(this is a problem with Phil of R - so many different debates overlap)

GregoryJL

However, I don't really like this sort of 'you too' argument, although it works well in debate - it might give one's opponent a reason for dispensing with the argument, but it doesn't actually show it to be mistaken. But I think it is. The main reason is that evil, particularly the most heinous, gratuitous sort, doesn't really strike anyone as 'inscrutable.' Some things are so bad that it doesn't only seem factually absurd but morally reprehensible to consider the possibility that these can be any sense 'ultimately' a good thing, which is precisely what a theodicy must show. Of course, that is no reason to discount a possible explanation on the back of this, but I think it shows that it is pretty implausible to consider these judgements inscrutable. One could apply Wysktra's line of argument to any sort of axiological judgement, and that seems absurd. Further, in some cases, if the supposed morally sufficient reason is suitably remote, it mightn't even be good at all. Even if it could be shown with some perfect knowledge analysis that the Asian Tsunami or the Second World War was ultimately good for the world, I don't think we'd change our judgement that these were, in fact, bad things.

Rowe lets Wyskstra off pretty lightly in his response to him, though, so maybe I've missed something he's picked up on.

Aye, this is the main objection I think to sceptical theism. I'm not sure if Wykstra's thought does undercut our ordinary moral practise (like you say ... it'd be a problem if it did). All that's needed is for the theist to believe that it's possible that God has a morally sufficient reason for letting the bad stuff happen (in Rowe's case, that God's allowing the fawn to die a painful death makes for some great good/avoids some great bad). But then, I think that the ePoE kind of collapses into the lPoE, so I would say that. :p: