Morality, assuming itexists, is a set of binding commands that allows mankind to distinguish betweenright & wrong and identify what should or should not be done. From what wecan observe, all societies (regardless of geographical, chronological, etc.separation) seem to share in a common “moral code”, which would suggest theexistence of a universal, objective moral law that is present independent ofmankind’s existence. It’s nature, therefore, is that it is inherent, universal,objective, and that it entrusts in mankind an obligation to do “the rightthing”. Yet does the fact that morality is inherent, universal, objective, andbinding (i.e. we have a duty to do what is right by this “moral code”) enableit to skirt the existence of God? It seems, however, that the contrary is true.The existence of morality, and its nature necessitates the existence of God –such is the conclusion of the Moral Argument.Thereare two types of moral argument: the theoretical and the practical. Thetheoretical moral argument (posited by the likes of H.P. Owen, John Newman, andC.S. Lewis) uses deduction to argue the existence of God, whereas the practicalmoral argument (as posited by Kant) explores the idea of obligation to showthat the existence of God is a logical necessity. Yet is this really the case?Does, in other words, the moral argument succeed in proving the existing ofGod?Thetheoretical moral argument is as follows. We, as humans, encounter experiencesof morality and its nature during our lives (e.g. it feels as if we – and thosewho we encounter - are dutifully bound by virtue of a common “conscience” to dothe right thing, and also as if we – and those who we encounter – feeluncomfortable when we do the wrong thing). Furthermore, it seems as if allhuman communities (past, and present) share a common notion of what is rightand what is wrong. Therefore, it is argued, morality (i.e. the moral law)exists independent of mankind as something objective and absolute. In order forthere to be such a law, there must be, by definition, a moral law-maker who hasthe power to create it. Only God, however, is capable (by virtue of his nature– i.e. omnipotent, omnibenevolent, omniscient, etc.) of creating an objectiveand absolute moral law. Therefore, it is argued, that God must exist. This isflawed.“If, as is thecase, we feel responsibility, are ashamed, are frightened at transgressing thevoice of conscience, this implies there is one to whom we are responsible…ifthe cause of these emotions does not belong to the visible world, the object towhich our perception is directed must be supernatural and divine”- JohnHenry NewmanNewmanargues to God from the idea of the conscience. He recognizes that there seemsto be something intrinsic in all men that regulates behaviour by rewarding“moral” actions (through positive emotions) and punishing “immoral” ones(through negative emotions such as guilt and shame). He proceeds to infer thatthe conscience must be the voice of God within us, thus necessitating theexistence of God. Yet Newman’s argument makes far too many assumptions to beconvincing. Since, Newman claims, the conscience is “more than a man’s own self”, and that “the man himself has no power over it, or only with extremedifficulty...he did not make it…he cannot destroy it”, the existence of theconscience proves the existence of God. Newman, however, is arguing from a positionof faith and thus fails to consider a secular explanation for the existence ofthe conscience (e.g. the socio-biological advantage of being biologicallyconditioned to respond positively to actions that are conducive to promotingtrust and mutual benefit within a community– “moral actions” – and to respondnegatively to actions that are conducive to the contrary – “immoral actions” sinceit is beneficial in assuring mutual survival). Instead, he assumes that theconscience is indicative of a “being exteriorto ourselves” (i.e. God) as it is a product of said exterior being. Thisassumes that God exists necessarily (as an intelligent designer or a FirstCause), which is demonstrative of circular reasoning. Furthermore, the verycommonality and nature of morality (and the conscience) seem to be indicativethat it is merely an evolutionary adaptation that has a genetic origin. Indeed,studies in animal behaviour (cf. CanAnimals Be Moral?) have shown that social mammals (e.g. rats, dogs,primates) can choose to act “morally” or “immorally” – evidence that moralityis not proper to humans and that both it and the conscience can be explainedbiologically. This shows that the nature of morality is not such that Godexists (as an alternative explanation that does not invoke a transcendent,omnipotent, divine being can be used to explain the phenomenon that is morality– which, according to Occam, is a superior one by virtue of simplicity) - thereforeNewman’s argument fails to prove the existence of God.Itis, however, argued by Hal Herzog that animal “morality” is rooted in instinct.This, he claims, is distinct from human morality, as human morality seems to beinformed more by conscious choice than by instinct. The distinction is evidentif we are to assess, as it were, the flip side of the coin – immorality.Ifwe observe the atrocities being carried out (and those that have been carried out)across the world (e.g. Syria, Nanking, Hiroshima, Rwanda, the Holocaust, and soon) we are able to discern an aspect of morality (i.e. extreme immorality),which is proper only to human beings. From this we can, through empiricalinduction, determine that there exists an exclusively human capacity for(extreme) immorality. “A beast can neverbe as cruel as a human being, so artistically, so picturesquely cruel”writes Dostoevsky, alluding to this facet of morality which only humans seem tohave the capacity to achieve. If this is true, it can also be argued that therealso exists an exclusively human capacity for (extreme) morality - this canalso be empirically verified (e.g. St. Francis, Mother Teresa, FlorenceNightingale, Dr. David Nott, and so on). Such capacities imply that there is aconscious choice to act in a biologically untoward manner (i.e. doing good forthe sake of doing good & doing evil for the sake of doing evil), whichanimals lack. Therefore it seems that it is this predilection for autonomousvirtue (or vice) which characterizes human morality and distinguishes (but doesnot separate) it from animal (biological) morality. Where on earth, this beingthe case, does this morality comefrom then?Kantmakes a distinction between what we considered to be animal morality (i.e.“moral” in consequence, but “biologically selfish” in intent) and humanmorality (i.e. “moral” in consequence and in intent – good for the sake ofgood) by separating autonomous actions (dispassionate, moral actions performedout of a conscious sense of duty) from heteronomous actions (emotive actionsthat are selfish in intent and, thus, can never be moral). This is instrumentalto Kant’s version of the moral argument - dissimilar to the theoretical moralargument proposed by Newman and his ilk (Owen & Lewis). In addition, theaspect of autonomous virtue (or vice) mentioned in the previous paragraph isconsidered within the structure of the practical moral argument. Moreover, Kantexplains how the practical moral argument is logically superior to thetheoretical one. Kantreasons that if God did exist, then he must exist outside the phenomenal realmand hence any objective knowledge of God is unavailable to us (since we existwithin the phenomenal realm). In addition to this, Kant proposes that the humanmind determines the way in which we experience reality, thus it is impossiblefor us to know “things in themselves”but only as we perceive them to be. This nullifies the inductive reasoning thatclaims it is possible obtain knowledge of God from an experience or feelingencountered in the phenomenal realm. This renders the theoretical moralarguments void (by virtue of being invalid). However, Kant claims that we mayobtain knowledge of God if we consider our sense of morality (right, wrong,duty, good, and their opposites). This forms the basis of the practical moralargument.Thepractical moral argument is as follows. Morality is based on duty (i.e. what weought to do). We are under obligation to be autonomously virtuous (i.e. dutyfor duty’s sake). Reason suggests we ought to act according to the categoricalimperative (“an unconditional moralobligation which is binding in all circumstances and is not dependent on aperson’s inclination or purpose”). A duty to do something implies anability to do said thing (ought implies can). We ought to aim for the summum bonum (the life of moralityrewarded by happiness), and, because ought implies can, the summum bonum must be acheiveable. However,we know cannot know empirically that the summumbonum is achievable because it is often the case, according to 2Pac, thatthe “good die young” (i.e. bad thingsfrequently happen to good people). Therefore it is only an omnibenevolent andomnipotent God who can guarantee that we attain the summum bonum. Thus if morality is to be at all meaningful, we mustassume that God is the guarantor of the summumbonum – if not in this life, then in the next. Hence, because ought impliescan and there is no can without God, the moral argument necessitates theexistence of God. Or does it?
“Goodness is one thing with me and another witha Chinaman, so it’s relative. Or isn’t it?” questions Ivan Karamazov.Indeed, Dostoevsky raises an important issue with the moral argument in The Brothers Karamazov – no two peopleexperience the same version of morality (as Kant argues, no one can ever seesomething as a thing in itself, merely a personal version of such thing).Despite this, it can still be argued that the notion of morality is fairlyconsistent throughout a given population. Yet the variation in morality,however, is both greater and more prominent between different cultures. It is,for example, perfectly acceptable (if not just) to stone a woman to death forwearing jeans or driving a car in certain parts of the Middle East; thispractice, however, would be considered intolerable and barbaric anywhere else.Another example would be the fundamentally differing attitudes towards raising(disciplining) children. It is commonplace in parts of East & South Asia(or part of Asian culture) for a parent to be more demanding and critical oftheir children (the infamous “Tiger Parent” style of raising children asdetailed by Amy Chua), whereas this form of parenting would be thought of ascruel and abusive to parents in the West. It is the very contrast between thesetwo styles of parenting that has gained popular attention in China, resultingin a series entitled “Tiger Mum & CatDad”. Indeed, the “Cat Dad” character (representative of the more nurturingstyle of parenting commonly employed in Western culture) has been subject toharsh criticism by viewers who frequently question the character’s masculinityand diminish his role in society. Unsurprisingly, Battle Hymn of the Tiger Mother drew similar flak from readers inthe United States, who questioned Chua’s method and likened it to child abuseand torture – it was, in their culture, immoral.
In 1950 a study wasconducted by Solomon Asch to determine the effects of the pressure of socialconformity. Volunteers were shown two cards – one with a single vertical lineand another with several. They were then asked to point out which two lineswere of the same height. In the control experiment, no problems wereencountered (i.e. volunteers answered correctly each time). It was when othervolunteers (these “volunteers” were actually hired by Asch to answerincorrectly) were present that discrepancies started to occur. On average theerror rate rose from under 1% (when the volunteer answered independently) toover 37% (when placed in the same room as other “volunteers” who were allgiving the same incorrect answer). This study enforces the idea that moralityis shaped by social pressures.
We can also, forexample, consider the citizens of AppenzellAusserhoden and Appenzell Innerhoden(two Cantons within Switzerland) during the late 20th Century whenthese two regions of Switzerland did not recognize women’s suffrage until 1989and 1991 respectively, despite global support for women’s suffrage (at thetime) amounting to over 95%. Evidence of what psychologists term the “insulteffect” (where exposure to vehemently contrary viewpoints serve only to inflameand re-affirm your certainty in the validity of your conviction). “It’s the majority who decides what’s crazy and what isn’t” (Journey to the End ofthe Night, Celine) - yet more evidence to suggest that social pressureslargely shape morality. It seems, therefore, that the case for the existence ofan objective, universal moral law is undermined; giving rise to the suggestionthat morality is merely a form of social indoctrination. Hence if the basis foran objective, universal moral law is not substantiated, then the nature ofmorality does not necessitate the existence of God.
If, however, we areto assume the existence of a universal moral code that informs the notion ofmorality held by all different cultures (i.e. an almost indiscernible bottomlayer or “base strata” of a universal morality that underpins all variations ofmorality) then, by virtue of its nature, God’s logical existence is necessary.Yet ethical theories can exist without needing to invoke the existence a divinebeing.
Ethical theories suchas Utilitarianism and Virtue Ethics do not require the existence of God. Yet indoing so, neither Mill, nor Aristotle reduces morality to a subjectivephenomenon of social indoctrination. Utilitarianism claims that man isnaturally inclined to act in a way that maximizes utility and that if he is nothe is conditioned to do so by various sanctions (both external and internal,neither divine). Indeed, even the Virtue Ethicist will not claim that moralitynecessitates the existence of God.
Inconclusion the nature of morality is such that God does not exist. Morality canbe explained naturalistically. In fact despite admitting that man has a moralobligation, Freud disputes that it is objectively binding and argues that it isan epiphenomenon of the mind. According to Freud, our sense of moral duty andthe “voice of conscience” stems from the subconscious section of the humanpsyche which he termed the “Super Ego”. This is yet further evidence to demonstrate that morality and consciencedo not necessarily require the existence of a transcendent, omnibenevolent,omnipotent, omniscient deity. Both are phenomena that can be reasonablyexplained using psychology and biology.