Boethius gives a fully satisfactory account of Gods timelessness and free will
The existence of God being within or outside of time is highly debated, with Boethius taking the stance that God exists outside of time, he is eternal. This is due to God’s divine omniscience, which can only be true omniscience, if he is acutely aware of all the actions, past, present and future. However, this raises questions such as “can we have free will, if God exists eternally and is aware of a future action” to occur. Supporters of Boethius approach are Oregon, Augustine and Sidwick, whereas Calvin would disagree with his stance. I strongly agree with the latter approach as I do not believe how God, who is acutely aware of all actions ,good or bad, can at the same time allow us to have free will, these two concepts seem entirely contradictory.
The notion that God exists eternally was first held by Origen and Augustine however, was popularised mainly due to Boethius. Here he posits that Gods timeless nature does not interfere with human free will. He exemplified his view on God and time using the example of a peaky loft. Like when standing on a peaky loft, a person can see all the movement of the people down below prior and future, similarly God can envision a persons past present and future simultaneously occurring in his eternal present. I would value this stance problematic as it immediately calls to question the validity of human free will since God is aware of all our actions, perhaps even before they have came into fruition. The way that God experiences time is very distinct to the way that humans do, we experience a time linearly whereas God experiences all three stages of time simultaneously. This could be deemed as convincing as it corresponds with traditional Christian theology and with God’s omniscience, as he is aware of events which are still unknown to us. This view is significant because it highlights how even though the future is known to God, it is still a mystery to humans, and therefore does not deprive us of our free will, and we can still ultimately be punished/awarded for a behaviour. He then further his stance on the compatibility of gods timelessness and human free will be introducing simple unconditional necessity. To exemplify if I see you walking you have to be walking necessarily however this necessity is dependent on your choice to go on a walk in the first place, your condition, these additions of successfully articulated well as it amalgamates how even with God, being aware of our future actions, we can still possessed free will as our choices are based on our conditional choices.
However, I find British as argument to be quite flawed and unsuccessful, especially around the idea of God being eternal and aware of our future actions. This could suggest that our future actions are set in stone. They cannot be changed as they have already covered necessarily to God, which implies that humans have no free will. John Calvin further demonstrates this point and expands, since God is aware of our actions, and since there is no way to surprise God and switch up and choose a different option that is unknown to him that we possess no free will. This view directly attacks Boethius stance that Gods timeless nature and free will are compatible because it demonstrates that since we have no opportunity to choose new choices that we truly do not have free will and further highlights how Boethius gives an unsatisfactory account.
The antithesis argument was opposed by Sedwick, who seemingly agrees with Boethius. He proposes that God being aware of a future action does not make us unable to have choices and argues that we still possess free will. His views can be exemplified using a restaurant. Just because you are familiar and aware that your partner will always choose to have chocolate cake does not suddenly stop them from being able to choose strawberry cake. This seems like an intelligible argument and seemingly does corroborate with Boethius views on Gods timeless and free will, because it exemplifies how choices can be made despite God’s foreknowledge. Like the partner who is most likely aware of the partners choice in cake, God is aware and knowing of a future action as for him they have occurred in his eternal present. However, this does not mean that this suddenly disables us to make choices. This strengthens Boethius views’ and further posits that free will and Gods timeless nature are compatible.
Upon reflection, I feel as though am important distinction should be made here is that Sidwick implies there’s always an air of doubt around the partners choice in cake. This is disparingly different from the Boethius views. For Boethius due to God’s omniscience there can be no air of doubt about the future, as everything has already occurred necessarily for God. So instead of Sidwick, seemingly strengthening Boethius views I would argue that it badly damages it, as it emphasises how unrealistic it is for this unwavering knowledge of the future to exist while simultaneously trying to keep hold of the notion of freewill. In light of Sidwicks, more realistic assertion, Boethius views on reconciling free will with Gods timeless nature falls short as it does not seem fathomable to see how free will and choice to make decisions can exist if nothing you do can ever “surprise "God or stray away from his predetermined destiny for individuals whereas with Sidwicks view this would be possible and therefore reconciles free will and gods timelessness to a much better degree.
To conclude, I do not agree that Boethius gives a satisfactory account of Gods timeless and free will as personally they are categorically incompatible. I would argue he sacrifices Gods other attributes such as love to force a relationship between his notion of Gods timeless nature and free will.