The Student Room Group

UK professor suffered discrimination due to anti-Zionist beliefs, tribunal rules

University of Bristol academic who was sacked after being accused of antisemitic comments wins ‘landmark’ decision

There’s more on the story here:
https://www.theguardian.com/education/2024/feb/05/uk-professor-suffered-discrimination-due-to-anti-zionist-beliefs-tribunal-rules
I like how the uni came out talking about encouraging responsible and sensitive attitudes to peoples differing views after trying to sack someone for their views and getting done for it 😀
Original post by StriderHort
I like how the uni came out talking about encouraging responsible and sensitive attitudes to peoples differing views after trying to sack someone for their views and getting done for it 😀

Good old Bristol I guess.
Reply 3
Good.

Sadly a lot of people wish to silence criticism of the the Zionism political movement or the Israeli government by always conflating it with antisemitism.
Original post by Gazpacho.
Good.

Sadly a lot of people wish to silence criticism of the the Zionism political movement or the Israeli government by always conflating it with antisemitism.

Agreed
I think this isn't a great decision for two reasons. Firstly, the merits of the specific case. While I think anti-Zionism in general is a perfectly defensible position (indeed, people would probably consider my stances on the Israel-Palestine conflict to be anti-Zionist, though that's not the label I'd use myself), Miller goes well beyond this into obsessive conspiracy theories.

Secondly, the broader tendency of how judges have started interpreting what constitutes a protected "philosophical belief" recently. Even if I fully agreed with Miller's views here, I don't think they should qualify. The inclusion of "philosophical belief" alongside religion as a protected category in the Equality Act was intended to cover belief systems which it wouldn't be accurate to describe as a "religion", but which work in a somewhat comparable way - namely, that they significantly influence how you live your life and see yourself to the point where they are a fundamental aspect of who you are. A prominent example would be veganism - it's not a religion, but it's a belief system that significantly impacts how you live your life on a day to day basis, and essentially sets ethical rules for what activities adherents consider themselves permitted or prohibited from taking part in. But in Miller's case, as in the case of Maya Forstater before him, judges have expanded this to include beliefs that are not really in any way comparable - beliefs that are essentially just political opinions.

Now, I'm not saying I think it should be legal to simply fire people for their political opinions - there should indeed be worker protections on this. But I don't think that should be at the same level as protections for discrimination on grounds of racism, sexism, homophobia, etc. And as I said, mere political opinions are not what the Equality Act was intended to protect.
Reply 6
Original post by anarchism101
I think this isn't a great decision for two reasons. Firstly, the merits of the specific case. While I think anti-Zionism in general is a perfectly defensible position (indeed, people would probably consider my stances on the Israel-Palestine conflict to be anti-Zionist, though that's not the label I'd use myself), Miller goes well beyond this into obsessive conspiracy theories.

Secondly, the broader tendency of how judges have started interpreting what constitutes a protected "philosophical belief" recently. Even if I fully agreed with Miller's views here, I don't think they should qualify. The inclusion of "philosophical belief" alongside religion as a protected category in the Equality Act was intended to cover belief systems which it wouldn't be accurate to describe as a "religion", but which work in a somewhat comparable way - namely, that they significantly influence how you live your life and see yourself to the point where they are a fundamental aspect of who you are. A prominent example would be veganism - it's not a religion, but it's a belief system that significantly impacts how you live your life on a day to day basis, and essentially sets ethical rules for what activities adherents consider themselves permitted or prohibited from taking part in. But in Miller's case, as in the case of Maya Forstater before him, judges have expanded this to include beliefs that are not really in any way comparable - beliefs that are essentially just political opinions.

Now, I'm not saying I think it should be legal to simply fire people for their political opinions - there should indeed be worker protections on this. But I don't think that should be at the same level as protections for discrimination on grounds of racism, sexism, homophobia, etc. And as I said, mere political opinions are not what the Equality Act was intended to protect.


I think it's an excellent use of the Equality Act.

We now have a culture of cancelling and sacking people for breaching some scared cultural orthodoxies in the culture wars. An attitude of fear, silence and intimation for the expression of an opinion.

Holding philosophical beliefs and opinions should be a protected characteristic. People shouldn't be sacked for wrong-think.
Reply 7
Original post by Gazpacho.
Good.

Sadly a lot of people wish to silence criticism of the the Zionism political movement or the Israeli government by always conflating it with antisemitism.

It really beggars belief that there are those, an alarming number no less, who are explicitly stupid enough to deny this as well. Its not like the Israelis dont use it as a cudgel as every single opportunity they can grasp. Merely look at, well, every single response (bar none really) to people noting their inhuman behaviour - person a notes the IDF target civilians and Bibi responds with some claptrap about them being a jew hater.
Ironic really as their doing this, not to mention anyone else, almost certainly drives people to actually dislike jews.
Original post by Pythian
I think it's an excellent use of the Equality Act.

We now have a culture of cancelling and sacking people for breaching some scared cultural orthodoxies in the culture wars. An attitude of fear, silence and intimation for the expression of an opinion.

Holding philosophical beliefs and opinions should be a protected characteristic. People shouldn't be sacked for wrong-think.

The Equality Act isn't a one-sided sword. Making something a protected characteristic doesn't just prohibit directly firing someone for that characteristic. It also requires employers to take measures to make sure they aren't indirectly discriminating in relation to a particular characteristic - and that can include regulating the workplace (or potentially even non-workplace!) speech of other employees.
Reply 9
Original post by anarchism101
I think this isn't a great decision for two reasons. Firstly, the merits of the specific case. While I think anti-Zionism in general is a perfectly defensible position (indeed, people would probably consider my stances on the Israel-Palestine conflict to be anti-Zionist, though that's not the label I'd use myself), Miller goes well beyond this into obsessive conspiracy theories.

Secondly, the broader tendency of how judges have started interpreting what constitutes a protected "philosophical belief" recently. Even if I fully agreed with Miller's views here, I don't think they should qualify. The inclusion of "philosophical belief" alongside religion as a protected category in the Equality Act was intended to cover belief systems which it wouldn't be accurate to describe as a "religion", but which work in a somewhat comparable way - namely, that they significantly influence how you live your life and see yourself to the point where they are a fundamental aspect of who you are. A prominent example would be veganism - it's not a religion, but it's a belief system that significantly impacts how you live your life on a day to day basis, and essentially sets ethical rules for what activities adherents consider themselves permitted or prohibited from taking part in. But in Miller's case, as in the case of Maya Forstater before him, judges have expanded this to include beliefs that are not really in any way comparable - beliefs that are essentially just political opinions.

Now, I'm not saying I think it should be legal to simply fire people for their political opinions - there should indeed be worker protections on this. But I don't think that should be at the same level as protections for discrimination on grounds of racism, sexism, homophobia, etc. And as I said, mere political opinions are not what the Equality Act was intended to protect.


i think i agree. i (tried to) read the (incredibly boring) judgment and couldn't understand how Miller passes the Grainger test on 'belief and not opinion'. yeah, he's done years of research on the subject and his mind is ‘fixed and is not amenable to change’ (unlike McClintock) but how does this manifest in his life that resembles a religion like the radical vegan or radical man-made climate change guy? for Grainger it’s serious, like the apocalypse is coming.

i can see forstater tho cuz she's so consumed by her beliefs she’s founded her own organisation. like that’s some dedicated missionary work right there. considering she’s just a tax adviser accountant or something with no authority on the subject of her beliefs; it's just some feelings.

thin lines in law tho, hey. all depends on who's sitting judge, and they can make anything semi-believable with enough words. they just gish gallop everyone
Original post by Genesiss
i think i agree. i (tried to) read the (incredibly boring) judgment and couldn't understand how Miller passes the Grainger test on 'belief and not opinion'. yeah, he's done years of research on the subject and his mind is ‘fixed and is not amenable to change’ (unlike McClintock) but how does this manifest in his life that resembles a religion like the radical vegan or radical man-made climate change guy? for Grainger it’s serious, like the apocalypse is coming.

i can see forstater tho cuz she's so consumed by her beliefs she’s founded her own organisation. like that’s some dedicated missionary work right there. considering she’s just a tax adviser accountant or something with no authority on the subject of her beliefs; it's just some feelings.

thin lines in law tho, hey. all depends on who's sitting judge, and they can make anything semi-believable with enough words. they just gish gallop everyone

I think perhaps it's the "fixed and not amenable to change" aspect that I feel is being misapplied here.

To expand a bit, the comparison to religion is instructive here. Most people don't adhere to a particular religion as a result of closely examining the evidence in a rational scientific manner and concluding that this particular religion is the correct one. They have other reasons for coming to their beliefs - faith, psychological comfort, community, heritage, lifestyle choices, etc. The reason why a Catholic is unlikely to be dissuaded from Catholicism as a result of new evidence emerging is because the evidence isn't really why they were a Catholic in the first place. Veganism and climate change related behaviours are somewhat similar in a way: while they might be somewhat more a result of particular evidence, they're still essentially normative beliefs about appropriate lifestyles and behaviours.

But Miller would presumably argue that he did indeed come to his beliefs here as a result of carefully studying evidence, and that they are not merely normative or faith-based. If he is not at least theoretically amenable to having his mind changed as a result of different evidence, then that merely reflects obstinacy, not a different, more deeply personal, kind of belief.
Reply 11
Original post by anarchism101
The Equality Act isn't a one-sided sword. Making something a protected characteristic doesn't just prohibit directly firing someone for that characteristic. It also requires employers to take measures to make sure they aren't indirectly discriminating in relation to a particular characteristic - and that can include regulating the workplace (or potentially even non-workplace!) speech of other employees.


I have just re-read your post above.
I assume you're an employment lawyer of some kind.
I have a few points I'd like to raise with you because it's quite interesting.

(1) How exactly would you distinguish a belief that is worthy of protection under the EA from those that strike you as being apposite. In your above post, you draw the comparison with some kind of mid-way religion, and say that veganism would qualify. You say, it (1) "significantly impacts how you live your life on a day to day basis" and (2) "essentially sets ethical rules ...". The same can surely be said of anti-Zionism? Surely people who seriously subscribe to the worldview find their day-to-day lives impact (e.g. refusing to do their business with companies that support Israel, or refusing to buy products from Israel etc.) and people who are anti-Zionist would invariably couch it in distinctly moral or ethical terms. Whilst I would find it hard to argue that anti-Zionism precedes ethical norms; it's unclear to me whether veganism "sets" the ethical rules, or whether the ethical rules that "sets" in the veganism. I would argue that they are probably contiguous as opposed to causal. At any rate, as the Forstater judgment showed, the courts were not really prepared to make arbitrary judgments about what qualifies as a legitimate/worthy genuinely held belief -- unless ofc it is totally contrary to human dignity. People who think that sex is binary or that anti-Zionism is a melific force can - and often do - read a lot of material and think through the arguments and discuss it with people. One of the conditions is that the "philosophical belief" should have a "similar status or cogency to a religious belief"; but what does that mean other than having really thought about something, perhaps went to talks and bought books etc. Which is what most people do with religion. Unless you're going to argue that it is a one-off belief, a mere opinion, or that they don't really hold it, or that it is just passing fad; I think you're going to have an up-hill battle drawing some nebulous line. The statute was clearly intended to catch broader miscellancy than mere religious beliefs. Also, you say in your above post that it should be a belief that is essentially a "fundamental aspect of who you are" -- but why can't anti-Zionism (in the anti-colonial side etc.) define you? Who is to say it doesn't? If you believe in something strongly enough it becomes important to your value system. How in the world is a court going to decide where to draw that line?

(2) I understand your point about indirect discrimination but I don't understand how that bears on employers duty to 'protect' them - wrt. e.g. anti-Zionism or veganism? Most employers don't offer food to their staff, and most don't go into those sorts of political discussions? Workplace & non-workplace speech has been regulated for some time now, and I take your point there. My view is that since the EA was passed, our culture has descended into a culture of fear and intimidation about expressing views and beliefs that depart from the "correct" orthodoxy. I think cancelling people and sacking them for these sorts of thought-crimes is a noble use of the EA. (But I appreciate you may have a different perspective).
Reply 12
Original post by Genesiss
i think i agree. i (tried to) read the (incredibly boring) judgment and couldn't understand how Miller passes the Grainger test on 'belief and not opinion'. yeah, he's done years of research on the subject and his mind is ‘fixed and is not amenable to change’ (unlike McClintock) but how does this manifest in his life that resembles a religion like the radical vegan or radical man-made climate change guy? for Grainger it’s serious, like the apocalypse is coming.

i can see forstater tho cuz she's so consumed by her beliefs she’s founded her own organisation. like that’s some dedicated missionary work right there. considering she’s just a tax adviser accountant or something with no authority on the subject of her beliefs; it's just some feelings.

thin lines in law tho, hey. all depends on who's sitting judge, and they can make anything semi-believable with enough words. they just gish gallop everyone


I think manifesting a belief is satisfied by writing a letter to the newspaper's editor, sending a tweet, writing a blog post, or going to Sunday mass etc. Not everyone goes to a march or joins a society about it, or - as you say - makes an organisation.

The fact that his mind is ‘fixed and is not amenable to change’ should be totally irrelevant. So what?
Reply 13
Original post by Pythian
I think manifesting a belief is satisfied by writing a letter to the newspaper's editor, sending a tweet, writing a blog post, or going to Sunday mass etc. Not everyone goes to a march or joins a society about it, or - as you say - makes an organisation.

The fact that his mind is ‘fixed and is not amenable to change’ should be totally irrelevant. So what?

idk what you're asking me here tbh. wdym 'so what'?

are you familiar with legal precedent and how that works? do you have a legal precedent for your opinion in the first para?

are you familiar with Grainger? a judge just can't ignore Grainger. there's a specific test that one must satisfy
Original post by anarchism101
I think this isn't a great decision for two reasons. Firstly, the merits of the specific case. While I think anti-Zionism in general is a perfectly defensible position (indeed, people would probably consider my stances on the Israel-Palestine conflict to be anti-Zionist, though that's not the label I'd use myself), Miller goes well beyond this into obsessive conspiracy theories.

Secondly, the broader tendency of how judges have started interpreting what constitutes a protected "philosophical belief" recently. Even if I fully agreed with Miller's views here, I don't think they should qualify. The inclusion of "philosophical belief" alongside religion as a protected category in the Equality Act was intended to cover belief systems which it wouldn't be accurate to describe as a "religion", but which work in a somewhat comparable way - namely, that they significantly influence how you live your life and see yourself to the point where they are a fundamental aspect of who you are. A prominent example would be veganism - it's not a religion, but it's a belief system that significantly impacts how you live your life on a day to day basis, and essentially sets ethical rules for what activities adherents consider themselves permitted or prohibited from taking part in. But in Miller's case, as in the case of Maya Forstater before him, judges have expanded this to include beliefs that are not really in any way comparable - beliefs that are essentially just political opinions.

Now, I'm not saying I think it should be legal to simply fire people for their political opinions - there should indeed be worker protections on this. But I don't think that should be at the same level as protections for discrimination on grounds of racism, sexism, homophobia, etc. And as I said, mere political opinions are not what the Equality Act was intended to protect.

What conspiracy theories
Reply 16
Original post by anarchism101
I think perhaps it's the "fixed and not amenable to change" aspect that I feel is being misapplied here.
To expand a bit, the comparison to religion is instructive here. Most people don't adhere to a particular religion as a result of closely examining the evidence in a rational scientific manner and concluding that this particular religion is the correct one. They have other reasons for coming to their beliefs - faith, psychological comfort, community, heritage, lifestyle choices, etc. The reason why a Catholic is unlikely to be dissuaded from Catholicism as a result of new evidence emerging is because the evidence isn't really why they were a Catholic in the first place. Veganism and climate change related behaviours are somewhat similar in a way: while they might be somewhat more a result of particular evidence, they're still essentially normative beliefs about appropriate lifestyles and behaviours.
But Miller would presumably argue that he did indeed come to his beliefs here as a result of carefully studying evidence, and that they are not merely normative or faith-based. If he is not at least theoretically amenable to having his mind changed as a result of different evidence, then that merely reflects obstinacy, not a different, more deeply personal, kind of belief.


In paragraph 217 of the judgment, with regard to the second criterion of the Grainger criteria, that a belief cannot be ‘an opinion or viewpoint based on the present state of information available’ (para. 24 of Grainger plc v. Nicholson (2009)), the tribunal found that Dr Miller ‘explained that his research into Zionism followed, but helped to reinforce, his beliefs about Zionism. The claimant is and was a committed anti-Zionist and his views on this topic have played a significant...role in his life for many years. His views were deeply held and not amenable to change’. Also, in paragraph 13(2) of the judgment, you can see that the University didn’t even challenge this. It challenges Dr Miller on every other criterion in the Grainger criteria, yet the second one is not resisted. In my opinion, based upon these facts alone, the hurdle to establish the second criterion was cleared by Dr Miller; thus, I would say the tribunal was justified, all other findings accepted, in concluding that anti-Zionism was a protected philosophical belief. However, I am neither a lawyer, let alone one that specialises in employment law, nor a law student, so my understanding could be completely incorrect.
(edited 8 months ago)
thats not good

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