UK professor suffered discrimination due to anti-Zionist beliefs, tribunal rules

I like how the uni came out talking about encouraging responsible and sensitive attitudes to peoples differing views after trying to sack someone for their views and getting done for it 😀

Good.

Sadly a lot of people wish to silence criticism of the the Zionism political movement or the Israeli government by always conflating it with antisemitism.

I think this isn't a great decision for two reasons. Firstly, the merits of the specific case. While I think anti-Zionism in general is a perfectly defensible position (indeed, people would probably consider my stances on the Israel-Palestine conflict to be anti-Zionist, though that's not the label I'd use myself), Miller goes well beyond this into obsessive conspiracy theories.

Secondly, the broader tendency of how judges have started interpreting what constitutes a protected "philosophical belief" recently. Even if I fully agreed with Miller's views here, I don't think they should qualify. The inclusion of "philosophical belief" alongside religion as a protected category in the Equality Act was intended to cover belief systems which it wouldn't be accurate to describe as a "religion", but which work in a somewhat comparable way - namely, that they significantly influence how you live your life and see yourself to the point where they are a fundamental aspect of who you are. A prominent example would be veganism - it's not a religion, but it's a belief system that significantly impacts how you live your life on a day to day basis, and essentially sets ethical rules for what activities adherents consider themselves permitted or prohibited from taking part in. But in Miller's case, as in the case of Maya Forstater before him, judges have expanded this to include beliefs that are not really in any way comparable - beliefs that are essentially just political opinions.

Now, I'm not saying I think it should be legal to simply fire people for their political opinions - there should indeed be worker protections on this. But I don't think that should be at the same level as protections for discrimination on grounds of racism, sexism, homophobia, etc. And as I said, mere political opinions are not what the Equality Act was intended to protect.

Good.

Sadly a lot of people wish to silence criticism of the the Zionism political movement or the Israeli government by always conflating it with antisemitism.

I think it's an excellent use of the Equality Act.

We now have a culture of cancelling and sacking people for breaching some scared cultural orthodoxies in the culture wars. An attitude of fear, silence and intimation for the expression of an opinion.

Holding philosophical beliefs and opinions should be a protected characteristic. People shouldn't be sacked for wrong-think.

I think this isn't a great decision for two reasons. Firstly, the merits of the specific case. While I think anti-Zionism in general is a perfectly defensible position (indeed, people would probably consider my stances on the Israel-Palestine conflict to be anti-Zionist, though that's not the label I'd use myself), Miller goes well beyond this into obsessive conspiracy theories.

Secondly, the broader tendency of how judges have started interpreting what constitutes a protected "philosophical belief" recently. Even if I fully agreed with Miller's views here, I don't think they should qualify. The inclusion of "philosophical belief" alongside religion as a protected category in the Equality Act was intended to cover belief systems which it wouldn't be accurate to describe as a "religion", but which work in a somewhat comparable way - namely, that they significantly influence how you live your life and see yourself to the point where they are a fundamental aspect of who you are. A prominent example would be veganism - it's not a religion, but it's a belief system that significantly impacts how you live your life on a day to day basis, and essentially sets ethical rules for what activities adherents consider themselves permitted or prohibited from taking part in. But in Miller's case, as in the case of Maya Forstater before him, judges have expanded this to include beliefs that are not really in any way comparable - beliefs that are essentially just political opinions.

Now, I'm not saying I think it should be legal to simply fire people for their political opinions - there should indeed be worker protections on this. But I don't think that should be at the same level as protections for discrimination on grounds of racism, sexism, homophobia, etc. And as I said, mere political opinions are not what the Equality Act was intended to protect.

i think i agree. i (tried to) read the (incredibly boring) judgment and couldn't understand how Miller passes the Grainger test on 'belief and not opinion'. yeah, he's done years of research on the subject and his mind is ‘fixed and is not amenable to change’ (unlike McClintock) but how does this manifest in his life that resembles a religion like the radical vegan or radical man-made climate change guy? for Grainger it’s serious, like the apocalypse is coming.

i can see forstater tho cuz she's so consumed by her beliefs she’s founded her own organisation. like that’s some dedicated missionary work right there. considering she’s just a tax adviser accountant or something with no authority on the subject of her beliefs; it's just some feelings.

thin lines in law tho, hey. all depends on who's sitting judge, and they can make anything semi-believable with enough words. they just gish gallop everyone

The Equality Act isn't a one-sided sword. Making something a protected characteristic doesn't just prohibit directly firing someone for that characteristic. It also requires employers to take measures to make sure they aren't indirectly discriminating in relation to a particular characteristic - and that can include regulating the workplace (or potentially even non-workplace!) speech of other employees.

i think i agree. i (tried to) read the (incredibly boring) judgment and couldn't understand how Miller passes the Grainger test on 'belief and not opinion'. yeah, he's done years of research on the subject and his mind is ‘fixed and is not amenable to change’ (unlike McClintock) but how does this manifest in his life that resembles a religion like the radical vegan or radical man-made climate change guy? for Grainger it’s serious, like the apocalypse is coming.

i can see forstater tho cuz she's so consumed by her beliefs she’s founded her own organisation. like that’s some dedicated missionary work right there. considering she’s just a tax adviser accountant or something with no authority on the subject of her beliefs; it's just some feelings.

thin lines in law tho, hey. all depends on who's sitting judge, and they can make anything semi-believable with enough words. they just gish gallop everyone

I think manifesting a belief is satisfied by writing a letter to the newspaper's editor, sending a tweet, writing a blog post, or going to Sunday mass etc. Not everyone goes to a march or joins a society about it, or - as you say - makes an organisation.

The fact that his mind is ‘fixed and is not amenable to change’ should be totally irrelevant. So what?

I think this isn't a great decision for two reasons. Firstly, the merits of the specific case. While I think anti-Zionism in general is a perfectly defensible position (indeed, people would probably consider my stances on the Israel-Palestine conflict to be anti-Zionist, though that's not the label I'd use myself), Miller goes well beyond this into obsessive conspiracy theories.

Secondly, the broader tendency of how judges have started interpreting what constitutes a protected "philosophical belief" recently. Even if I fully agreed with Miller's views here, I don't think they should qualify. The inclusion of "philosophical belief" alongside religion as a protected category in the Equality Act was intended to cover belief systems which it wouldn't be accurate to describe as a "religion", but which work in a somewhat comparable way - namely, that they significantly influence how you live your life and see yourself to the point where they are a fundamental aspect of who you are. A prominent example would be veganism - it's not a religion, but it's a belief system that significantly impacts how you live your life on a day to day basis, and essentially sets ethical rules for what activities adherents consider themselves permitted or prohibited from taking part in. But in Miller's case, as in the case of Maya Forstater before him, judges have expanded this to include beliefs that are not really in any way comparable - beliefs that are essentially just political opinions.

Now, I'm not saying I think it should be legal to simply fire people for their political opinions - there should indeed be worker protections on this. But I don't think that should be at the same level as protections for discrimination on grounds of racism, sexism, homophobia, etc. And as I said, mere political opinions are not what the Equality Act was intended to protect.

I think perhaps it's the "fixed and not amenable to change" aspect that I feel is being misapplied here.
To expand a bit, the comparison to religion is instructive here. Most people don't adhere to a particular religion as a result of closely examining the evidence in a rational scientific manner and concluding that this particular religion is the correct one. They have other reasons for coming to their beliefs - faith, psychological comfort, community, heritage, lifestyle choices, etc. The reason why a Catholic is unlikely to be dissuaded from Catholicism as a result of new evidence emerging is because the evidence isn't really why they were a Catholic in the first place. Veganism and climate change related behaviours are somewhat similar in a way: while they might be somewhat more a result of particular evidence, they're still essentially normative beliefs about appropriate lifestyles and behaviours.
But Miller would presumably argue that he did indeed come to his beliefs here as a result of carefully studying evidence, and that they are not merely normative or faith-based. If he is not at least theoretically amenable to having his mind changed as a result of different evidence, then that merely reflects obstinacy, not a different, more deeply personal, kind of belief.